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Global Health 
Security in an Era 
of Global Health 
Threats
To the Editor: Global health 
security is the protection of the 
health of persons and societies 
worldwide. It includes access to 
medicines, vaccines, and health care, 
as well as reductions in collective 
vulnerabilities to global public health 
events that have the potential to 
spread across borders. For example, 
transboundary zoonotic diseases such 
as avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infections 
affect animals and humans, thereby 
threatening health security worldwide 
because of their high death rates 
(≈60% in humans) (1).
During the past 15 years, fairly 
standardized responses to threats 
have been implemented around the 
globe. Some of these responses have 
been against severe acute respiratory 
syndrome and avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1), which have been overseen by 
a well-resourced international health 
system (2).
These global health threats 
have raised the highest levels of 
political and social concern. This 
concern has provoked governments 
and international agencies to 
address health threats through a 
security rationale, which emphasizes 
the themes of national security, 
biosecurity, and human security. 
This amalgamation of health issues 
and security concerns has produced 
a notion of health security, which 
is dominated by technical medical 
approaches and pharmaceutical 
interventions. These approaches and 
interventions have already begun to 
shape the way international health 
policy is formulated (3).
A global vision of health security 
is very much part of contemporary 
rhetoric. However, this vision 
lacks the drive and speed needed 
to make proposals materialize and 
operationalize ideas in the geographic 
areas where they are most desperately 
needed. Small beneﬁ   ts accrue to 
members of vulnerable populations 
who, in fact, are those most likely 
to be affected by epidemic diseases. 
A public health security design that 
impinges on a global approach runs the 
risk of neglecting cultural, economic, 
ecologic, and social conditions on 
the ground. Regional approaches that 
address hazards and threats may be 
more inclusive of context-speciﬁ  c 
conditions (4).
Global public health threats 
related to infectious pathogens of 
animal origin are expected to rise. To 
address these threats, several experts 
and strategists suggest the initiation 
of a worldwide early-alerting and 
-reporting mechanism. Aggregation 
of disease threats through an event-
focused Web-based platform could 
enable this mechanism. This timely 
gathering of disease intelligence can 
inform policymakers about the nature 
of risks. Disease maps can display 
details needed to design tailored 
policies and control measures to tackle 
diseases according to their speciﬁ  cs 
(5).
Leading scientists and researchers 
continue to try to understand the global 
temporal and spatial patterns of animal 
diseases. This understanding is gained 
through an array of instruments, 
ranging from the use of satellite 
images to cutting-edge molecular 
technologies. The momentum so far 
has created an open forum for decision- 
makers to collaborate with the leading 
international agencies to advocate 
for surveillance, identiﬁ  cation,  and 
control of zoonotic diseases to uphold 
global public health security (6).
However, global initiatives suffer 
from the free-rider problem and from 
moral hazards. Some low-income 
countries with weak governance have 
alerted the international community 
about their fragile health care systems 
to capture a nontrivial portion 
of funds that seldom reach their 
intended destinations. These resource 
allocations to developing countries 
foster aid dependence (7).
The international technical 
agencies tasked with upholding 
animal and human health should 
remain at the forefront of identifying 
and addressing evolving threats. 
This process will demand continuous 
ﬂ  exibility, agility, and a coordinated 
international effort. Attaining goals of 
mitigating threats and reducing risks 
posed by the emergence of zoonoses 
requires close collaborations with 
national health authorities and local 
governments. The large investments 
planned to improve foresight and 
prevention might or might not work. If 
they do not work, apportioning blame 
to countries or regions for disease 
ﬂ  are-ups can result in social, political, 
cultural, and economic consequences 
that in the past have turned out to be 
unjustiﬁ   ed, unfair, and ultimately 
detrimental (8).
Clearly, global health threats can 
be reduced only by the concerted 
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actions of national and international 
actors. In the years ahead, the 
international community will almost 
certainly be expected to bring its 
formidable technical knowledge, 
skills, and analytic capabilities to 
confront this expanded global health 
threat environment (9).
It would be wrong, however, to 
forget the many insights that current 
advances in epidemiology and 
surveillance have delivered. In fact, 
should the impetus to ﬁ  nance a global 
health agenda encounter opposition 
or obstacles, it would seem easier 
and logical to strengthen already 
functional activities.
Lastly, the realities and the 
prevalent policymaking environment 
have created a trap between a desire to 
prioritize global health by portraying 
aspects of it as an existential security 
issue and the fact that security 
ultimately might not be the most 
useful language for describing and 
institutionalizing the health threats 
and hazards confronted by societies 
around the world (10). Regardless of 
whether a trap has been created, action 
is urgently needed.
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Use of Workplace 
Absenteeism 
Surveillance Data 
for Outbreak 
Detection
To the Editor: We applaud Mann 
et al. on their use of a school-based 
absenteeism surveillance system to 
compare daily all-causes absenteeism 
data against a historic baseline to 
detect outbreaks of inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness (ILI) as an adjunct to traditional 
disease reporting (1). The growing 
availability of electronic human 
resources systems has increased 
the potential to harness near real-
time workplace absenteeism data 
to complement school absenteeism 
surveillance and other sources of 
traditional outbreak surveillance.
In London, United Kingdom, 
during the ﬁ   rst wave of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 2009, workplace 
absenteeism data from the Transport 
for London attendance/absence 
reporting system were compared with 
the historical baseline 3-year mean for 
comparative weeks of the year. The 
proportion of Transport for London 
employees absent because of self-
reported or medically certiﬁ  ed  ILI, 
during June 28–October 17, 2010, 
generated surveillance alerts when 
compared with historical baseline data 
above the 95th and 99th percentile 
thresholds (SDs 1.96 and 2.58). 
For the same period, cause-speciﬁ  c 
workplace inﬂ  uenza  absenteeism 
data were highly correlated with 
routinely published ILI surveillance, 
including the National Pandemic Flu 
Surveillance and sentinel General 
Practitioner systems (Figure) (2).
In Australia, workplace all-causes 
absenteeism for a major Australia-
wide employer has been included as 
a nonspeciﬁ   c indicator of inﬂ  uenza 
surveillance by the Australian 
government for >15 years. A recent 
study during a severe inﬂ  uenza season 
in Australia conﬁ  rmed that employee 
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Letters
Letters commenting on recent articles 
as well as letters reporting cases, 
outbreaks, or original research are 
welcome. Letters commenting on ar-
ticles should contain no more than 
300 words and 5 references; they are 
more likely to be published if submitted 
within 4 weeks of the original article’s 
publication. Letters reporting cases, 
outbreaks, or original research should 
contain no more than 800 words and 
10 references. They may have 1 
Figure or Table and should not be di-
vided into sections. All letters should 
contain material not previously pub-
lished and include a word count.